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KILLER CARTOONS: ISLAMOPHOBIA, DEPICTIONS
OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD, AND THE
POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS OF FREE SPEECH
CHIDIEBERE T. MADU*
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 3, 2015, the Curtis Curwell Center of Garland, Texas
was attacked by two heavily armed American-Muslim extremists.'
Armed with assault rifles, bulletproof body armor, and hundreds of
rounds of ammunition, the gunmen shot and wounded a security
guard.2 Before the gunmen could attack other civilians, they were
both killed on the scene in a vicious gunfight with local police.3 Their
attack of the Curtis Curwell Center was motivated by the "Draw Mu-
hammad" Contest, which awarded $10,000 to the contestant who
draws the "best caricature of the Prophet Muhammad."4 In the Mus-
lim faith, idol worship is strictly forbidden, thus the depiction of the
Prophet Muhammad is seen as exceedingly blasphemous and offen-
sive.5 Following the attack, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2017; Staff
Member, First Amendment Law Review.
1 Liam Stack, Texas Police Kill Gunmen at Exhibit Featuring Cartoons of Muham-






s While the Koran itself is silent on the issue of visual representation of people,
Islamic supplemental teachings, or hadiths, prohibit any visual depiction of Mu-
hammad or any other prophet. See generally SAHIH AL-BUKHAR, HADITH: 7.834,
7.838, 7.840; see also Daniel Burke, Why Images of Mohammad Offend Muslims,
CNN (May 4, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/04/living/islam-prophet-
images/.
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("ISIL") extolled the gunmen's actions and later claimed responsibil-
ity.6
The "Draw Muhammad" Coiltest was sponsored and orga-
nized by the anti-Islam group, American Freedom Defense Initiative
("AFDI"), led by former journalist Pamela Geller.7 Given AFDI's histo-
ry and message,8 the art exhibit was likely intended to disparage Is-
lam through exercising freedom of speech.9 Additionally, the art ex-
hibit itself was a response to the recent attack on the French satirical
news magazine, Charlie Hebdo, which left 12 dead and 11 wounded
only four months earlier in France.10 The art exhibit is one of many
examples of the pervasive cycle of violence resulting from Islam-
ophobia in Western societies.
This Note explores what options the government and citizens
have, if any, to regulate Islamophobic hate speech-particularly de-
pictions of the Prophet Muhammad-while still respecting the First
Amendment of the Constitution. Part 11 provides a brief summation
of the recent history of Islamophobia and explores violent responses
to satirical depictions of the Prophet Muhammad that have taken
place around the world. Part III examines the First Amendment case
law regarding unprotected and hateful speech and applies the exist-'
ing rules to the Curtis Curwell Center shooting. Part IV presents a
6 Julie Watson, Doubts Raised About Islamic State Claim in Texas Attack, DETROIT
NEWS (May 5, 2015),
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/05/prophet-
cartoon-contest-shooting/26910391/.
7 Stack, supra note 1.
8 See generally ATLAS SHRUGS, www.pamelageller.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
9 See Active Anti-Muslim Groups, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER,
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/20 15/active-
anti-muslim-groups; see also ATLAS SHRUGS, www.pamelageller.com (last visited
Mar. 3, 2016).
10 Jon Herskovitz & David Schwartz, Gunman in Mohammad Cartoon Attack in
Texas Monitored for Years, THOMPSON REUTERS (May 5, 2015),
http://in.reuters.com/article/usa-shooting-texas-idNKBNONPO2Z20150505;
see also Adam Withnall & John Lichfield, Charlie Hebdo Shooting: At Least 12





three-part solution for regulating and limiting Islamophobic speech:
(1) through the regulation of forums; (2) a national security advoca-
cy test modified from Brandenburg v. Ohio;" and (3) the revival of
the Heckler's Veto from Feiner v. New York.12 Next, Part V presents
the prevailing counterarguments to the solutions proposed in Part
IV. Finally, this Note closes with Part VI, which summarizes the Note
and explains why steps should be taken, either privately or by the
government, to curtail the prevalence of Islamophobic rhetoric.
11. ISLAMOPHOBIA EXPLAINED AND THE HISTORY OF RETALIATORY
ATTACKS
Islamophobia is typically defined as "the fear, hatred, and
hostility toward Muslims and Islam,"'3 and the "closed-minded prej-
udice" toward the religion and its followers.14 In other words, Islam-
ophobia encompasses the religious hatred of Muslims as well as ra-
cial hatred of those predominantly associated with Islam-namely,
Middle Eastern, Arabic-appearing people.15
Islamophobia most notably surged in Western cultures after
al-Qaeda attacked the United States on September 11, 2001.16 In re-
sponse to the attack, stereotypes of the iconic "Muslim terrorist"
were perpetuated in the media, by politicians, and in the entertain-
ment industry, not only in the United States, but also throughout Eu-
rope.'7
11 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
12 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
13 TODD H. GREEN, THE FEAR OF ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE WEST
3 (2015).
14 COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS,
http://www.islamophobia.org/about.html ( ast visited Jan. 28, 2016).
15 This includes non-Muslims who are perceived to be Muslims by Islam-
ophobes. For example, there has been a spike in hate-inspired attacks on Sikhs
since 2001. History of Hate: Crimes Against Sikhs Since 9/11, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/07/history-of-hate-
crimes-against-sikhs-since-911_n_1751841.html.
16 See CARL W. ERNST, ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF INTOLERANCE 1,
(2013).
17 See, e.g., id.
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Particularly, this Note is concerned with Islamophobia in the
form of political cartoons and the violent responses that follow. As
mentioned above, depictions of the Prophet Muhammad as political
cartoons are intrinsically Islamophobic because such cartoons ex-
plicitly violate the Islamic faith's prohibition on idolatry and visual
representations of the Prophet Muhammad.18 Additionally, these po-
litical cartoons are typically made in defiance of and with animus
towards Islam for the purpose of satirizing the religion's set of be-
liefs.19
A. Jyllands-Posten and the Faces of Muhammad Controversy
The first highly-publicized instance of Islamophobic depic-
tions of the Prophet Muhammad occurred in 2005 in the popular
Denmark newspaper, Jyllands-Posten.20 Four years after the 9/11 at-
tacks, Jyllands-Posten, "a right-leaning [conservative] -Danish news-
paper" notorious for taking anti-migrant positions, was involved in
the "Face[s] of Muhammad" controversy.21 The culture editor of
Jyllands-Posten sent a request to 42 cartoonists around Europe seek-
ing illustrations of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad to be published
in the newspaper.22 Only 12 cartoonists replied to Jyllands-Posten's
request with submissions of "cartoons or caricatures" of the Prophet
Muhammad, which were all published in the newspaper on Septem-
ber 30, 2005.23 Of the published illustrations, some of the most of-
fensive included depictions of the Prophet Muhammad as a stick fig-
1o See Burke, supra note 5.
19 E.g., Catherine Taibi, These Are The Charlie Hebdo Cartoons That Terrorists
Thought Were Worth Killing Over, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/07/charlie-hebdo-cartoons-paris-
french-newspaper-shooting-n_6429552.html. Given the history of outrage for
these depictions, it is safe to assume that the journalists were aware of why the
depictions are offensive.
20 GREEN, supra note 13, at 190-91.
21 Id. at 190-203; see also Jyllands-Posten Muhammad Cartoons Controversy,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jyllands-
PostenMuhammad cartoons-controversy (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
22 GREEN, supra note 13, at 191.
23 Id. at 192.
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ure angrily wielding a scimitar saying "[s]top stop [sic] we ran out of
virgins," and, most notably, wearing a bomb-shaped turban with the
Arabic writing of the Islamic declaration of faith, or Shahada: "There
is no god but God, and Muhammad is His messenger."24
The response to these published cartoons was worldwide,
varied, and at times, violent. In support of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, various European newspapers "republished
the cartoons as a gesture of solidarity with Denmark and Jyllands-
Posten," whereas the United Kingdom and the United States largely
shied away from the controversy.25 One of the republishing newspa-
pers was the French satirical newspaper, Charlie Hebdo.26 The repub-
lications of these cartoons led to vehement criticism from not only
Muslims in European countries, but also the Muslim community at-
large.27
Members of the Muslim community responded in non-violent
ways such as boycotting Danish products throughout the Middle
East2 8 and periodically protesting Jyllands-Posten.29 Additionally,
24 Id. at 192; Cartoons of Muhammad, ASSYRIAN INT'L NEWs AGENCY (Feb. 1, 2006),
http://www.aina.org/releases/20060201143237.htm (featuring all twelve de-
pictions of Muhammad which were published in the "Faces of Muhammad" is-
sue).
25 GREEN, supra note 13, at 195 (noting that with the exception of the Philadelph-
ia Inquirer and the New York Sun, who republished one or more of these car-
toons, the United States largely stayed away from the controversy).
26 Thierry Leveque, French Court Clears Weekly in Mohammad Cartoon Row,
THOMPSON REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/industry-
france-cartoons-trial-dc-idUSL2212067120070322 ("A French court on Thurs-
day ruled in favor of a satirical weekly that had printed cartoons of the Prophet
Mohammad, rejecting accusations by Islamic groups who said the publication
incited hatred against Muslims.").
27 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 194-95.
28 Id. at 194 ("[A] boycott on Danish goods swept through the Middle East be-
ginning in late January 2006 and lasting into the spring. Danish companies such
as Arla, Scandinavia's largest dairy producer, suffered significantly from the
boycott. In fact, Danish exports across the board suffered huge losses during
that period.").
29 See Jyllands-Posten Muhammad Cartoons Controversy, BERKLEY CENT. FOR
RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS. AT GEO. UNIV.,
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/em-jyllands-posten-em-
muhammad-cartoons-controversy.
20161 KILLER CARTOONS 493
ambassadors from Muslim countries sought to stop the offensive
publications by sending letters to Denmark Prime Minister Anders
Fogh Rasmussen.30 Despite the controversy, Prime Minister Rasmus-
sen firmly stood by the Danish newspaper and replied concisely:
"Freedom of expression is absolute."31 Prime Minister Rasmussen's
unapologetic tone arguably "added fuel to the fire" and set off a se-
ries of violent responses throughout the Muslim world. In fact, this
controversy also elicited criticisms from the U.S. State Department32
and former President Bill Clinton.33
In an unpredicted, violent response to the Prime Minister's
words, many Danish embassies in Muslim countries were attacked
and set ablaze: namely, in Damascus, Syria,34 Beirut, Lebanon,35 Teh-
ran, Iran,36 and Islamabad, Pakistan.37 These attacks left dozens of
30 Id. at 193 ("On October 12, ambassadors and representatives from eleven
Muslim countries wrote a letter to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Denmark's prime
minister, criticizing what they believed was a campaign to demean Muslims.").
31 GREEN, supra note 13, at 194.
32 Lloyd Vries, U.S.: Muhammad Cartoon "Offensive", CBS NEWS (Feb. 3, 2006),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-muhammad-cartoon-offensive/ ("The
State Department criticized on Friday cartoon drawings in Europe of the
Prophet Muhammad, calling them 'offensive to the beliefs of Muslims.' While
recognizing the importance of freedom of the press and expression, department
press officer Janelle Hironimus said these rights must be coupled with press re-
sponsibility.").
33 Tim Graham, Bill Clinton Protests "Outrageous" Anti-Islam Cartoons, But What
About WashPost "Art"?, NEwsBUSTERs (Feb. 2, 2006, 10:17 PM),
http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/tim-graham/2006/02/02/bill-clinton-
protests-outrageous-anti-islam-cartoons-what-about-
washpost#sthash.IncK9098.dpuf ("Former US president Bill Clinton warned of
rising anti-Islamic prejudice, comparing it to historic anti-Semitism as he con-
demned the publishing of cartoons depicting Prophet Mohammad in a Danish
newspaper. 'So now what are we going to do? . .. Replace the anti-Semitic prej-
udice with anti-Islamic prejudice?' he said at an economic conference in the Qa-
tari capital of Doha.").
34 Embassies Burn in Cartoon Protest, BBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2006, 23:27 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/4681294.stm.
35 Danish Embassy in Beirut Torched, BBC NEWS (Feb, 5, 2006, 19:35 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/4682560.stm.
36 Danish Embassy in Tehran Attacked, GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2006, 14:11 EST),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/06/religion.uk1.
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Scandinavians and Muslims wounded, and in some cases, dead.38 Un-
fortunately, because of the severity of these attacks, the nonviolent
protesters were overshadowed. So began the cycle of Islamophobic
speech that continues to incite violence attributed to the whole reli-
gion of Islam rather than law-breaking extremists.
B. The Charlie Hebdo Shooting
More recently, the French satirical newspaper, Charlie Hebdo,
suffered a tragic attack in response to political cartoons of the
Prophet Muhammad in January 2015.39 On January 7, 2015, two
heavily armed French-Muslim gunmen, later identified as brothers
Ch6rif and SaYd Kouachi,40 attacked the headquarters in response to
the newspaper's long-standing anti-religious views, trivialization of
Islam, and most notably, satirical depictions of the Prophet Muham-
mad.41 The attack left 12 journalists dead and 11 wounded.42
37 Jane Perlez & Pir Zubair Shah, Embassy Attack in Pakistan Kills at Least 6, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 3, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/world/asia/03pakistan.html. This at-
tack occurred much later than the first three, but was.notably perpetrated by al-
Qaeda. Id.
3 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 193-94.
3 Adam Withnall & John Lichfield, Charlie Hebdo Shooting: At Least 12 Killed as




40 Lizzie Dearden, John Lichfeld & Cahal Milmo, Charlie Hebdo Attack: Paris Po-
lice Name Three Suspects in Manhunt as Kouachi Brothers and Surrendered 18-




4 1 See Withnall and Lichfield, supra note 39; Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, Char-
lie Hebdo: A Profile of the Satirical Magazine, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-a-profile-
of-the-french-satirical-magazine-9962720.html; see generally Max Read, What
Is Charlie Hebdo? The Cartoons that Made the French Paper Infamous, GAWKER
Uan. 7, 2015, 10:35AM), http://gawker.com/what-is-charlie-hebdo-and-why-a-
mostly-complete-histo-1677959168 (illustrating many examples of the maga-
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Somewhat like the Faces of Muhammad controversy involv-
ing Jyllands-Posten only nine years prior, the Charlie Hebdo attack
was met with varied responses. However, for the most part, the at-
tack sparked widespread support in the mourning of the journalists
who were killed and wounded-particularly facilitated by the #JeSu-
isCharlie ("I am Charlie" in French) campaign.43
Interestingly, despite Jyllands-Posten being the first newspa-
per to post depictions of the Prophet Muhammad, they were not
supporters of Charlie Hebdo and its controversial depictions in
2015.44 In fact, Jyllands-Posten was the only Denmark daily newspa-
per that chose not to republish Charlie Hebdo's cartoons in the af-
termath of the attack.45 The chief editor of Jyllands-Posten, Jorn Mik-
kelsen, defended his decision, stating, "I maintain the right as an
editor to be able to print all types of drawings again at some, point.
Just not right now .... The truth is that for us it would be completely
irresponsible to print old or new Prophet [Muhammad] drawings
right now."46
Additionally, Jyllands-Posten's foreign editor and orchestra-
tor of the Faces of Muhammad inquiry, Flemming Rose, said that,
"Jyllands-Posten has stood alone the past nine years [and] [n]o one at
any point has worn 'je suis Jyllands-Poster' t-shirts in the way they
have with Charlie Hebdo."4 7 Rose received heavy criticism from me-
dia peers, and some suspected that Jyllands-Posten had "caved to ji-
zine's anti-religious stance and including the "Charia Hebdo" issue which is
linked to the January 2015 attack).
4 2 Withnall and Lichfield, supra note 39.
43 See Sian Boyle, Je Suis Charlie! The Cry of Defiance: Vast Crowds Rally Across
the World to Condemn the Gun Massacre as Francoise Hollande Declares Tomor-
row a Day of Mourning, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2900835/Crowds-gather-central-
Paris-solidarity-murdered-Charlie-Hebdo-journalists-slogan-Je-Suis-
Charlie.html ("[Iln London and around the world with crowds holding placards
bearing the slogan #JeSuisCharlie, which means 'I am Charlie' in French.").
44 Jacob Wheeler, The Newspaper that First Published Muhammad Cartoons




4 7 See id.
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hadists."48 During one interview, Rose was asked if militant Islamists
control newsroom decisions.49 Rose replied, "Yes, it's true. [Militant
Islamists] already do,"50 thus showing a chilling effect in the leader-
ship of jyllands-Posten ewsroom.
C. The "Draw Muhammad" Contest
After the Charlie Hebdo shooting, the next attack related to
Islamophobic speech occurred at the Curtis Curwell Center of Gar-
land, Texas. As mentioned in Part I, the American Freedom Defense
Initiative ("ADFI") hosted the "Draw Muhammad" Contest on May 3,
2015, which awarded a cash prize to the best caricature of the Mus-
lim prophet.51 AFDI, also known as Stop Islamization of America, is a
recognized hate group led by Pamela Geller.5 2 Geller is known for
opposing the construction of a Muslim community center near
ground zero of the World Trade Center53 and for launching anti-
Muslim ad campaigns in major metropolitan areas like New York
City and Boston.54 Therefore, unlike Jyllands-Posten and Charlie Heb-
do, AFDI hosted the event from a blatant Islamophobic position, and
its depictions of the Prophet Muhammad were not an "accessory" to





51 Stack, supra note 1; see also Eyder Peralta, 5 Things To Know About The Or-
ganizers Of Muhammad Cartoon Contest, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 4, 2015, 11:23
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/04/404158281/5-
things-to-know-about-the-organizers-of-mohammed-cartoon-contest.
52 Robert Steinback & Bri Hermanson, The Anti-Muslim Inner Circle, SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW. CENTER (June 17, 2011), https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
hate/intelligence-report/2011/anti-muslim-inner-circle.
53 See Tanya Somanader, Pam Geller: Park5l Is "The Second Wave of the 9/11 At-
tack," THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 24, 2010, 2:40 PM)
http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2010/11/24/131936/pam-geller-park51/.
54 E.g., Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp., 781 F.3d 571 (1st Cir.
2015).
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The art contest, which took place four short months after the
Charlie Hebdo shooting, was conducted in direct defiance of Islamic
sensitivities.55 The event organizers clearly anticipated a violent re-
sponse, as they spent "upwards of $50,000" on security.56 In inter-
views following the event, Geller claimed to be standing up to the
"liberal media's" cowardice and the "savages" who perpetrated the
attacks on Charlie Hebdo.57 Additionally, the art contest was the first
notable instance of the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad to take
place in the United States and the first time Americans were attacked
for that reason.58 In the aftermath, ISIL showed admiration for the
shooting and lauded the gunmen's efforts.59 ISIL went as far claiming
responsibility for influencing the gunmen to attack.60
D. Govermental Response
Although no one was killed in Garland-other than the at-
tackers-and the only person injured was a security guard,61 this
event is still concerning. Will events like the "Draw Muhammad"
Contest continue to occur in the United States? Will these contests
also be followed by a violent retaliatory response? Where, if any-
where, does the First Amendment allow the government o step in?
The depictions of the Prophet Muhammad, aggressive Islam-
ophobia, and the retaliatory attacks have created a profound conflict
between the First Amendment and the government's interest in pub-
lic safety and national security. Loretta Lynch, the Attorney General
of the United States, has specifically addressed the issue of "anti-
55 See Holly Yan, Garland Shooting: What is the American Freedom Defense Initia-
tive?, CNN (May 4, 2015, 2:42 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/04/us/what-is-american-freedom-defense-




58 See Stack, supra note 1.
5 9 See Watson, supra note 6.
60 d
61 Stack, supra note 1.
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Muslim" (or Islamophobic) speech which incites violence.62 Her
words may be a preview of the White House and Department of Jus-
tice's intentions to prosecute such speakers.63 In speeches, Lynch has
noted the large spike in hate crimes which have taken place both
against Muslims and perceived Muslims in recent years,64 speech
which she considers "un-American" and overall counterproductive
to the United States' endeavors in fighting terrorism.65 Though these
statements were made recently and a formal plan has yet to be pre-
sented, Attorney General Lynch's statements show the White House
is aware of the conflict between freedom of speech and public safety
and is continuing to investigate it.
The remainder of this Note will explore this conflict, and con-
sider whether a federal or state government can, consistent with the
First Amendment, limit Islamophobic speech, such as depictions of
the Prophet Muhammad, on grounds of public safety and nation se-
curity concerns. Further, this Note will consider whether the First
Amendment allows the government to censor or regulate depictions
of the Prophet Muhammad to prevent the incitement of violence by
Islamic extremists.
Ill. METHODS OF CONTENT-BASED CENSORSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Chaplinksy Categories
In a historic opinion, Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire66 laid the
foundation of modern First Amendment jurisprudence for the types
of speech that may be proscribed, and the Supreme Court of the
United States has been reluctant to consider adding more to the




64 TRUENEWS VIDEO: AG Loretta Lynch to Prosecute "An ti-Muslim Speech,"
YouTUBE (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBkPcRSi03o.
65 Id.
66 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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list.67 While Chaplinsky itself focused exclusively on "fighting" words,
the Court nonetheless broadly identified the following types of
speech that are "low-value" and do not receive heightened First
Amendment protection: "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the li-
belous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace."68
Because the depictions of the Prophet Muhammad are not
typically sexualized-at least to the point warranting a First
Amendment analysis of obscenity or lewdness69-the obscenity and
lewdness exceptions will be conceded as inapplicable and will not be
addressed here. Also, since the Prophet is not capable of being "de-
famed" pursuant to common law,7 0 libelous speech will also be con-
sidered inapplicable.
1. Profanity
The leading authority regarding First Amendment profanity
is Cohen v. California.7' In Cohen, the speaker was convicted under
California Penal Code § 415, which prohibited "maliciously and will-
fully disturbing the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person ...
67 E.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) ("The Government ar-
gues that 'depictions of animal cruelty' should be added to the [Chaplinsky] list.
It contends that depictions of 'illegal acts of animal cruelty' . . . 'lack expressive
value,' and may accordingly 'be regulated as unprotected speech' ..... The First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.").
68 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
69 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) ("However, sex and ob-
scenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex
in a manner appealing to prurient interest"); see also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975) (administering an obscenity and lewdness test for
a nude drive-through theater).
70 Common law defamation has four elements: (1) a defamatory statement; (2)
publishing of that statement; (3) the published statement is of and concerns the
plaintiff; (4) the defamatory statement has somehow damaged the plaintiffs
reputation. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (establishing
the "actual malice" requirement for defamation and libel of public figures).
71403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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by ... offensive conduct."72 The speaker wore a jacket displaying the
phrase, "Fuck the Draft" outside of a municipal courthouse where
"women and children [were] present."73 Justice Harlan, speaking for
the majority, reversed Cohen's conviction on the grounds that the
"State may not . .. make the simple public display . . . of this single
four-letter expletive a criminal offense."74 Additionally, "the State has
no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammati-
cally palatable to the most squeamish among us."75 In his opinion,
Justice Harlan sought to make a doctrinal decision which implicated
our "fundamental societal values" regarding the freedom of speech,
rather than a narrow case-by-case approach to petitioner's creative,
or "trifling," way of voicing dissent to the Vietnam War.76 As Justice
Harlan noted, "[O]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric."77
Since Cohen, the Supreme Court has been particularly unwill-
ing to uphold outright bans on certain expressions because a state
legislature found them "profane" or offensive,78 unless the speech is
so pervasive that it cannot be avoided without "prior warnings."79
This proves that the Court is reluctant to make bright-line rules
which render specific speech, even if widely understood as patently
offensive to the "most squeamish" audiences (like "fuck"), subject to
censorship to prevent it from offending people.
72 Id. at 16 (quotations omitted).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 26.
7 Id. at 25.
76 Id. at 25 ("We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem
a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege,
these fundamental societal values are truly implicated.").
77 Id.
78 E.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (invalidating nu-
dity ban for drive-thru theaters) ("Rather, absent the narrow circumstances de-
scribed above, the burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid further
bombardment of (his) sensibilities simply by averting (his) eyes."') (quoting
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21).
7 E.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(upholding the Federal Communications Commission's decision to not broad-
cast George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue including extensive discussion
of the words "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits").
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To justify censorship based on profane content, the govern-
ment must prove that the content-based restriction advances a nar-
rowly tailored and compelling interest.80 Attempts to censor sacrile-
gious speech and symbolism for its profane nature have failed since
Cohen. For example, in Skokie v. National Socialist PartyA the Illinois
Supreme Court faithfully applied the standard from Cohen and found
that Neo-Nazi parades in the predominantly Jewish town (including
many Holocaust survivors) failed to satisfy a narrowly tailored com-
pelling interest.82
Similarly, attempts by other religious groups to censor
speech have also failed under Cohen. For example, in Snyder v.
Phelps,83 the Court recognized the Westboro Baptist Church funeral
protests and verbal assaults of the believers of any monotheistic re-
ligion (primarily Christianity) were protected by the First Amend-
ment.8 4 Additionally, in NEA v. Finley8 s the Court gave First Amend-
ment protection to a photograph entitled Piss Christ, which depicts a
miniature crucifix immersed in the artist's urine.86 This federally-
funded artistic photograph was protected speech even though the
piece is highly offensive to Christians (particularly Catholics).87
Though these are only a few examples, one could argue that since all
these other religions have to put up with profane, sacrilegious ex-
80 E.g., id. at 762 (upholding the FCC's decision with "society's right to protect its
children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years, and
with the interest of unwilling adults in not being assaulted by such offensive
speech in their homes").
81 Vill. of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill.2d 605 (1978).
82 Id. at 612 ("The decisions of [the United States Supreme Court], particularly
Cohen ... , in our opinion compel us to permit the demonstration as proposed,
including display of the swastika.")
83 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
84 Id at 459-60.
85 Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding the
NEA's decision to redistribute funding from Andres Serrano after criticism, but
stating that Serrano did in fact receive federal funding for his piece); see also
Piss Christ, UNIV. OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
https://www.usc.edu/schools/annenberg/asc/projects/comm544/library/ima
ges/502.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
86 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 574.
87See id. at 606.
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pressions that satirize and at times disparage their faith, why should
Islam have special consideration through categorical censorship?
Considering Cohen and the history of proscribing profanity, it
is unlikely that this kind of content-based limitation on depictions of
the Prophet Muhammad would survive scrutiny. First, the applicabil-
ity of Cohen to depictions of the Prophet Muhammad is not immedi-
ately clear since the depictions do not contain words. Cohen and its
progeny concern the proscription of "taboo words" laden in an ex-
pression of speech.88 However, if we consider taboo to be a "pro-
scription on behavior for a specific community in a specific con-
text,"89 then a depiction of the Prophet Muhammad would be a taboo
expression. Consequently, the "proscribed behavior" is the act of de-
picting the Prophet Muhammad, and the "specific community and
context" are Muslims. Arguably, this broad conceptualization of ta-
boo could allow for depictions of the Prophet Muhammad to be in-
terpreted as profane to a certain audience.
Here, the compelling interest for a proscription of depictions
of the Prophet Muhammad for their profanity could be arguably jus-
tified as not offending Muslims. This justification, however, will sure-
ly be insufficient. Absent any reason for giving the religion of Islam
preferential treatment, almost all conceivable religions in the United
States are unprotected from speech they find offensive.
This argument illustrates why efforts to censor depictions of
the Prophet Muhammad as profane speech will fail. Just like other
expressions that are offensive to certain audiences, existing First
Amendment jurisprudence will not support censorship for its offen-
siveness. But the analysis of the traditional low-value speech catego-
ries does not end here.
2. Fighting Words
The strongest argument for wanting to limit or otherwise
censor depictions of the Prophet Muhammad is not to focus on the
88 See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
89 CHRISTOPHER M. FAIRMAN, FUCK: WORD TABOO AND PROTECTING OUR FIRST
AMENDMENT LIBERTIES 27 (2009).
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offensiveness of any given depiction, but rather to consider the hos-
tile reaction the expression incites. Thus, the remaining Chaplinsky
category to be addressed is the fighting words doctrine-speech
which by its very utterance provokes a hostile reaction.90
In Chaplinsky, the criminal defendant was a Jehovah's Wit-
ness who was distributing literature on a busy street in Rochester,
New Hampshire.91 While distributing the literature, Chaplinksy was
believed to be denouncing all religion as a "racket," and called local
public officials and other passersby "damned Fascists."9 2 Pursuant to
New Hampshire state statute, Chaplinksy was charged and convicted
for unlawfully "address[ing] any offensive, derisive or annoying
word to any other person" on a public street.93
The issue presented before the Court was whether Chaplin-
sky's speech could be punished or otherwise censored by state ac-
tion, implicating First Amendment protection through the Four-
teenth Amendment's incorporation.94 The Court, speaking through
Justice Murphy, rejected Chaplinsky's plea for protection and quoted
Cahtwell v. Connecticuts to hold that "epithets or personal abuse
[are] not in any proper sense communication of information or opin-
ion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a crimi-
nal act would raise no question under that instrument."96 Further,
this case presented an objective standard used by the New Hamp-
shire state court to determine when to apply its fighting words stat-
ute: "The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of what a par-
ticular addressee thinks. The test is what men of common
90 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
91 Id. at 569.
92 Id
93 Id. (citation omitted) ("No person shall address any offensive, derisive or an-
noying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public
place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or ex-
clamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy
him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.").
94 See id. at 570.
95 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing the breach of peace conviction of Jehovah's
Witness who played a record to people including defamatory statements to-
wards the Catholic Church).
96 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309-10.
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intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an av-
erage addressee to fight."9 7
Despite this demarcation, the fighting words doctrine has
been anything but clear. Even the definition of phrase itself, "fighting
word," has not been obvious. We know that calling someone a
"damned Fascist" in 1942 Rochester, New Hampshire was punisha-
ble, but it would be naive to believe the same is true in 2015. After
reading Cantwell and Chaplinksy, one would believe that somewhere
in the annals of First Amendment jurisprudence exists an exhaustive
list of "fighting words" written by the Supreme Court. Unfortunately,
any legal scholar pursuing this search would leave empty-handed
and unsatisfied.
However, we do know a few things about fighting words
from subsequent Supreme Court cases. First, for speech to be con-
sidered under this doctrine, the speech must be a "direct personal
insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs." 9 8 In Texas v. Johnson,99
the Court rejected the state's argument that burning the United
States flag could be construed as fighting words because, as stated by
Justice Brennan, "No reasonable onlooker would have regarded
Johnson's [burning of the flag]" as an insult meant for them.100
Therefore, the fighting words doctrine is not invariably invoked just
because the speaker's expression could provoke someone who sees
or hears it (e.g., a patriotic citizen seeing someone desecrate the
flag).
This "direct target" requirement of the fighting words doc-
trine differentiates it from the other low-level speech categories-
with the exception of libelous speech-and thus makes it difficult to
apply. In fact, the Supreme Court has not upheld a conviction based
on the fighting words doctrine since the Chaplinksy decision 73 years
97 Chaplisnky, 315 U.S. at 573.
"Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989).
99 Id.
100 Id.; see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (holding that a
demonstration by a civil rights leader who burned an American flag in public
protest was not "so inherently inflammatory as to come within that small class
of'fighting words').
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ago.101 This has led many legal scholars to consider the fighting
words doctrine as effectively dormant, meaningless, and "nothing
more than a quaint remnant of an earlier morality that has no place
in a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free expres-
sion."102 Although debate of the fighting words doctrine's effective-
ness continues, this Note will accept its doctrinal value and apply it
for the sake of analysis.
In order to classify depictions of the Prophet Muhammad as
"fighting words" worthy of censorship, state officials could argue
that these depictions are directly targeted at all members of the Mus-
lim community. If we consider these depictions to be Islamophobic
speech because of their "blasphemous" nature, it follows that de-
monizing and ridiculing Islam and its believers-the apparent goal
of Islamophobia-is analogous to an "invitation to exchange fisti-
cuffs" in Justice Brennan's view.103 Therefore, Muslims, as a class, are
the direct target of these fighting words. One downfall of this argu-
ment is that its next logical conclusion would be that all other derog-
atory and discriminatory statements and expressions directed to-
wards a religious, racial, ethnic, or other "targeted class" of people
would invoke the fighting words doctrine.
Indeed, this "targeted class" theory invoking the fighting
words doctrine has been rejected by the Supreme Court and other
lower courts.104 For example, reconsider the issue of flag burning. In
Street and Johnson, the New York and Texas state governments re-
spectively argued for recognizing federal employees or patriotic
Americans as a targeted class for fighting words when someone des-
ecrates the American flag.105 The majority in both courts rejected
this argument on grounds that the reasonable onlooker would not
101 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 98 (4th ed. 2012).
102 Stephen A. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 536
(1980).
103 johnson, 491 U.S. at 397.
104 See, e.g., Street, 394 U.S. 576 (reversing conviction of civil rights protestor
burning American flag); Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (invalidating Texas's prohibition
on flag desecration as fighting words); see also Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party, 69
Ill.2d 605 (1978) (invalidating injunction against Nazi protestors).
10s See generally Street, 394 U.S. 576;Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.
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feel directly attacked because of the tenuous relationship between
the onlooker and the alleged target group.106 Additionally, the tar-
geted class theory fails when the class is more tangible than federal
employees.
For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the no-
tion that the entire Jewish community of Skokie should be consid-
ered the target for fighting words.107 Skokie is especially relevant be-
cause anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are arguably sides of the
same discriminatory coin. In Skokie, the town sought injunctive relief
from the National Socialist Party of America, a white supremacist,
Neo-Nazi organization that planned to parade through the town of
Skokie dressed in Nazi uniforms, brandishing swastikas, and carry-
ing banners such as, "Free Speech for the White Man."' 08 The town's
concern was that the National Socialist Party specifically targeted
Skokie to threaten the Jewish community and remind two million
survivors of the Holocaust that "the Nazi threat is not over, [and the
Holocaust] can happen again."109
The Illinois Supreme Court, after the Supreme Court of the
United States remanded the case and allowed the Socialist Party's
application for stay,110 found for the Socialist Party and maintained
that the injunction was an unconstitutional denial of speech protect-
ed by the First Amendment."' Specifically, the Illinois Court found
that the depiction of a swastika was insufficient to satisfy the fighting
words doctrine because it was not "so offensive and peace threaten-
ing to the public" to justify the town's injunction.112 Although the
Court acknowledged that "the sight of [a swastika] is so abhorrent to
the Jewish citizens of Skokie ... and [] the survivors of the Nazi per-
106 See Street, 394 U.S. at 592;Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397.
107 Skokie, 69 Ill.2d at 615.
108 Id. at 610.
109 Id at 611.
110 Nat'l Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1977), remanded, Skokie v.
Nat'l Socialist Party, 69 Ill.2d 605 (1978), cert. denied.
111 Skokie, 69 1Il.2d at 615.
112 Id.
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secutions," it also found that "this factor does not justify enjoining
[the Socialist Party's] speech."113
Given the decisions in Johnson, Street, and Skokie, one could
reasonably expect that applying the fighting words doctrine to pro-
tect a group of Muslims will also not pass First Amendment scrutiny.
It is difficult to imagine a more applicable target of fighting words
than the Holocaust survivors living in Skokie, Illinois, who were
taunted and reminded of their Nazi tormentors who killed and tor-
tured their friends and family.
Still, there is also a key difference between a swastika and de-
pictions of the Prophet Muhammad that might not render the deci-
sion in Skokie controlling, which could allow for alternate venues of
regulation beyond the exhaustive list of Chaplinsky. That difference is
the context surrounding the expression. Arguably, a swastika and a
Nazi parade in 1984 do not mean the same thing as an art exhibit
solely for depicting the Prophet Muhammad does in 2015. In any
kind of censorship analysis, it is imperative that we remember "the
First Amendment does not command [us to use] tunnel vision."114
Each issue need not be determined in a vacuum, unburdened by pub-
lic sentiment and domestic or international concerns, nor should ab-
solutist and rigid ideologies be favored. Instead, we should consider
each expression in the context it is uttered or displayed.
For example, it is very likely that the Skokie Court would
have ruled differently had it been decided thirty years earlier-in
the wake of World War II-when the context of the expression
would have been wholly different. The importance of context can ex-
plain many landmark cases, especially in First Amendment jurispru-
113 Id. at 617 ("We do not doubt that the sight of this symbol is abhorrent to the
Jewish citizens of Skokie, and that the survivors of the Nazi persecutions, tor-
mented by their recollections, may have strong feelings regarding its display.
Yet it is entirely clear that this factor does not justify enjoining defendants'
speech.").
114 Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First Amend-
ment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1337, 1393 (2006).
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dence that, taken out of their context, seem extreme or unsupported
by existing doctrine.115
The decisions in Schenck v. United Statest1 6 and its progeny
affirmed convictions of protestors and public officials disrupting the
war efforts.11"7 Today, such a result would be unspeakable, but in the
early twentieth century, that result was deemed necessary when the
Red Scare of communism in America was real and concerning.118 Ad-
ditionally, consider the ruling in West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette"l9 just after World War II, where Justice Jackson ex-
plained a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation" is that we
must never "force citizens to confess" their allegiance to our flag,
even in a public school, for that is what separates us from the totali-
tarian regimes we abhor.120 And most recently, in Holder v. Humani-
tarian Law Project,121 a majority of the Court upheld the Patriot Act's
criminal punishments for individuals who provided non-violent "ma-
11s See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding
that students were protected by the First Amendment from being forced to sa-
lute the American flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance in school).
116 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (unanimously affirming the conviction of defendants who
distributed anti-war documents to men who have accepted the draft).
117 E.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (affirming conviction of
German newspaper publishing articles which criticized World War I efforts);
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (affirming conviction of national
leader of Socialist Party and presidential candidate, Eugene Debs, for speech
which praised war dissenters and included anti-war themes); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (affirming conviction of defendants who threw anti-
war leaflets from out windows).




119 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
120 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624 ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citi-
zens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.").
121 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (preventing the Humanitarian Law Project from providing
assistance to Turkish and Sri Lankan militant groups in peacefully resolving
conflicts).
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terial support" to terrorist organizations, a decision likely motivated
by a desire to avoid legitimizing or in any way effectively supporting
organizations like the one which attacked the United States on Sep-
tember 11, 2001.122 A recurring theme in these landmark decisions is
the Court's appreciation for the context in which they occur. It can be
argued that the Court realizes there are exceptions to these rules and
the proscription of certain expressions can be more or less justified
because of context, thus transcending the Chaplinsky categories.
B. The Brandenburg Test
Parallel to the Chaplinsky categories in First Amendment ju-
risprudence is a more recent test for speech which advocates for vio-
lence: the test developed in Brandenburg v. Ohio.123 In Brandenburg,
the leader of a Ku Klux Klan rally was convicted under Ohio's crimi-
nal syndicalism statute which punished the advocacy of violence as a
means for political reform.124 During the rally, in a private, secluded
farm outside of Cincinnati, the leader made statements suggesting
that Blacks be "returned" to Africa, Jews be "returned" to Israel, and
called for a violent "revengeance [sic]" against the groups in an act to
take back their city.1 25 The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision,
reversed the conviction of the Klan leader and found the statute un-
constitutional because the statements proscribed were punishable
before any imminent harm occurred.126
Legal scholars have later interpreted the Brandenburg deci-
sion to require three elements before similar speech can be punished
or limited: (1) express advocacy for violence (or unlawful action);
(2) the advocated violence is immediate; and (3) the violence is like-
122 Serge Schmemann, Hijacked jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/national/12PLAN.html.
123 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
12 4 Id. at 444-45.
12 5 Id. at 446-47.
12 6 Id. at 448-49.
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ly to occur.127 Many have argued that the Brandenburg advocacy test
is too protective of speech and has been difficult to use to sustain a
conviction, thus rendering the test hollow and unusable.128 Despite
its critics, the Brandenburg test is still highly relevant to assess de-
pictions of the Prophet Muhammad.
The first element of the Brandenburg test is express advocacy
for violence.129 In the context of depictions of the Prophet Muham-
mad, one can argue that the "express advocacy for violence" would
be the act of depicting the Prophet with the knowledge that such a
depiction is inherently blasphemous to Muslims and could draw a
violent retaliation. This argument, however, is not without flaws.
First, there is a stark difference between the kind of violent
advocacy in Brandenburg and in the case of depicting the Prophet
Muhammad. In Brandenburg, the speaker was a KKK member alleg-
edly seeking to motivate his cohort to commit violent crimes.130 In
contrast, those depicting the Prophet Muhammad do so peacefully
and do not commit violent acts themselves; instead they are attacked
by radicalized gunmen responding to their depiction.131 This distinc-
tion can be further equated to the difference between incitement
(Brandenburg) and provocation (Chaplinsky fighting words). Thus,
the Brandenburg test as it exists today is not applicable to these de-
pictions.
For the sake of argument, the remaining two Brandenburg
elements will also be considered briefly. The second and third ele-
ments, the immediacy of the advocated violence and the likelihood of
the advocated violence, have a better argument to be satisfied. In the
recent history of attacks responding to depictions of the Prophet
Muhammad, we have seen that a specific event or publication has
127 Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advoca-
cy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REv. 209,240 (1994).
128 E.g., Rice v. Paladin Enter., 128 F.3d 223 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that Bran-
denburg is not controlling to prosecute the publisher of a hit man book which
extolled the lifestyle of contract murders and teaching such methods with de-
tail).
129 Schwartz, supra note 127, at 241.
130 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45.
131 E.g., Stack, supra note 1.
20161 KILLER CARTOONS 511
been associated with the attack and served as a motive for the at-
tackers.132 Additionally, the likelihood of violence at these events is
implicitly evidenced by Pamela Geller and the ADFI by their decision
to spend $50,000 on security, armed guards, and Garland police of-
ficers.133 However, despite the immediacy and likelihood of the at-
tack, the current Brandenburg test requires all elements to be satis-
fied, and the Supreme Court has set the standard for finding express
advocacy (the first factor) remarkably high.134 With the clear distinc-
tion between incitement and provocation, success on this legal theo-
ry is unlikely. Therefore, the existing Brandenburg advocacy for vio-
lence test will fail to proscribe depictions of the Prophet Muhammad.
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the Chaplinsky catego-
ries and the existing Brandenburg test, this Note seeks to answer
whether depictions of the Prophet Muhammad should be a type of
expression that requires special treatment. In doing so, three alter-
nate solutions will be presented: (1) government censorship through
forum regulation; (2) a proposal for a modified Brandburg test with
a national security caveat; and (3) the resurgence of the Heckler's
Veto.
IV. GOVERNMENT REGULATION BY FORUMS, NATIONAL SECURITY
INTERESTS, AND THE HECKLER'S VETO
The government, unlike a private actor, has much less discre-
tion when regulating free speech because much of government cen-
sorship is proscribed by the First Amendment.135 However, notwith-
132 E.g., Read, supra note 41.
33 Yan, supra note 55.
134 E.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (reversing the conviction of an
antiwar protestor who shouted to "take the fucking street") ("At best . . . the
statement could be taken as counsel for present moderation; at worst, it
amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite fu-
ture time.").
us U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech."); see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("Thus, while
statutory or common law may in some situations extend protection or provide
redress against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free
512 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14.
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standing the Chaplinsky categories discussed above,136 other excep-
tions exist for the government to make regulations and limitations to
speech when they are sufficiently justified by varying standards of
scrutiny.137
A. Forum Regulation
First, the government can regulate speech in certain forums.
Particularly, there are three kinds of forums created by the govern-
ment: traditional public forums (e.g., public streets and parks),38
designated public forums (e.g., schools and public advertising spac-
es),139 and nonpublic or limited forums (e.g., military bases and pris-
ons).140 Of the three types of forums, traditional and designated pub-
lic forums must show that when speech is regulated on the basis of
content, the regulation is "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave[s] open ample alternative channels
of communication," thus satisfying strict scrutiny.141 Alternatively,
nonpublic or limited forums need only satisfy a standard akin to rea-
sonableness or rational basis, showing that the proscribed speech
was not within the type of speech for which the forum was "lawfully
expression of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the Constitu-
tion itself.").
13 6 See text accompanying note 63.
137 E.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (uphold-
ing a District of Columbia prohibition of sleeping in parks as a constitutional
limitation on expressive speech); Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512
U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding 36-foot buffer zone as a reasonable way to protect
access to a health clinic from anti-abortion protestors).
138 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) ("This Court
long ago recognized that members of the public retain strong free speech rights
when they venture into public streets and parks....").
139 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
("A second category consists of public property which the State has opened for
use by the public as a place for expressive activity.").
140 See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) ("The State, no less than a pri-
vate owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control
for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.").
141 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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dedicated."142 These are the relevant standards through which rele-
vant government regulations of forums will be analyzed.
In the last few years, ADFI has been involved in an anti-Islam
advertisement campaign across the United States. Particularly, their
campaign involved three legal disputes with municipal transit au-
thorities rejecting ADFI's anti-Islam advertisements: New York,143
Detroit,144 and Boston.145 In two of the three cases, the local munici-
pal governments were successful in limiting ADFI's defamatory ad-
vertisements,146 but in one case, the local government failed because
of a crucial, legally operative fact: the status of the forum.147
The first of the cases, and the only unsuccessful case for the
government, took' place in New York City.148 Here, ADFI sought to
run an advertisement on Metropolitan Transit Authority ("MTA")
buses that read as follows: "In any war between the civilized man
and the savage, support the civilized man. / Support Israel,/ Defeat
Jihad."149 The MTA, following its written advertising standards, de-
termined that this advertisement violated their "no-demeaning
standard" which prohibits advertisements that "contain'-. . . infor-
mation that demean[s] an individual or group of individuals on ac-
count of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, gender, age,
disability or sexual orientation."150 MTA further argued that ADFI's
advertisement implicitly equated Palestinians, Muslims, Arabs, or
anyone who does not support Israel's endeavors, to "savage[s]," thus
directly opposed to their "no-demeaning" standard.'5' Though the
1
4 2 Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47.
143 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 880 F. Supp.2d 456
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
144 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg'I Transp., 698
F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2012).
145 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571 (1st Cir.
2015).
146 See generally Suburban Mobility Auth., 698 F.3d at 885; Mass. Bay Transp.
Auth., 781 F.3d at 571.
147 Seegenerally Metro. Transp. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 459.
151 Id.
11 ld. at 464.
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district court agreed that the MTA properly applied their "no-
demeaning" standard,152 the court accepted ADFI's argument that
the "no-demeaning" standard itself was an unconstitutional view-
point discrimination because the MTA advertising space was consid-
ered a designated public forum.153 Ultimately, the determination of
the advertising space as a designated public forum served as a dis-
positive factor to rule in favor of the ADFI.
What made the MTA case unique is the operative precedent
which declared that specific advertising space as a designated forum.
Only about 15 years ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transportation
Authority154 held that the exterior of a New York City public bus "was
a designated public forum." 55 That precedent was binding upon the
district court when the AFDI case was argued.15 6 Additionally, the
district court in the AFDI decision limited its ruling to "not disable
city authorities from adopting rules that hold ads and commentary
on the exteriors of buses to a standard of civility."15 7 This case was
merely the application of dominating precedent which tied the
MTA's hands from regulating later speech.
In contrast, Detroit successfully rejected ADFI's Islamophobic
advertisement proposal for their buses at the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.158 In Detroit, ADFI submitted an adver-
tisement which read as follows: "Fatwa on your head? Is your family
152 Id. at 468-69 ("MTA was reasonable-indeed, clearly correct-to regard the
AFDI Ad as demeaning a group of people based on religion (Islam) and/or na-
tional origin and ancestry (from 'Muslim countries' in the Middle East).").
153 Id. at 476 ("MTA does not offer any justification or selectively allowing de-
meaning speech to appear on the exterior of its buses, let alone demonstrate
that its content-based restriction on transit advertising is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest, as is necessary to survive strict scruti-
ny.").
154 136 F.3d 123 (1998).
1 Id. at 130.
156 Metro. Trans. Auth., 880 F. Supp.2d at 470 (citing New York Magazine, 136
F.3d at 129).
15 Id. at 477.
158 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg'1 Transp., 698
F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2012).
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or community threatening you? Leaving Islam? Got Questions? Get
Answers! Refugefromlslam.com."159 Though arguably not Islam-
ophobic, Detroit was able to reject this advertisement pursuant to its
transit advertisement prohibitions on "political or political campaign
advertising" and "advertising that is clearly defamatory or likely to
hold up to scorn or ridicule any person or group of persons."60
However, Detroit was successful in their prohibition because the
Sixth Circuit found a nonpublic, limited forum to be present-
therefore, the regulation is only subject to a "reasonableness" stand-
ard.161 Further, the Sixth Circuit recognized that a prohibition on po-
litical speech satisfied the reasonableness required and found in fa-
vor of the City.162
Additionally, and most recently, Boston successfully rejected
a round of ADFI's Islamophobic advertisements for their buses at the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.163 The same "civi-
lized man" versus "savages" advertisement was presented by the
ADFI.164 The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA"),
like the MTA of New York, has a policy that rejects advertisements
that disparage or demean individuals or a group of people.165 How-
ever, unlike the MTA, the MBTA had dispositive precedent hat sup-
ported their argument in defending their no-demeaning regula-
tion.166 In Ridley v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority,167
the First Circuit held that the restriction on the display of advertise-
ments that "demean or disparage" individuals or groups does not vi-
olate the First Amendment.168 The Ridley court's finding was based
on MBTA's rejection of political advertisements, which evidenced the
1s9 Id. at 888.
160 Id. at 888-89.
161 Suburban Mobility Auth., 698 F.3d at 892-93; see also Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
162 See Suburban Mobility Auth., 698 F.3d at 896.
163 See generally Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp., 781 F.3d 571
(1st Cir. 2015).
164 Id. at 575.
165 Id. at 574.
166 Id.
167 390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004).
168Id. at 96.
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government's interest in making a limited forum rather than a des-
ignated public forum.169 Thus, the First Circuit's reliance on Ridley
trumped the AFDI's viewpoint discrimination argument and Boston
successfully regulated Islamophobic speech.170
Given the success of Detroit and Boston, their strategy of lim-
ited forums and regulatory boards can be extended to depictions of
Muhammad. For example, if ADFI or another similarly Islamophobic
group sought to post depictions of Muhammad on subway cars, bus-
es, trains, or other public transit vehicles, a municipality could readi-
ly reject this speech while looking towards the First and Sixth Circuit
determinations for support. However, as with the case of New York,
if the forums targeted for speech are either traditional or designated
public forums, the government's ability to regulate speech is severe-
ly curtailed. This fatal designated public forum distinction likely
would have been applied to the Curtis Curwell Center ("the Center")
of Garland, Texas, the venue of the "Draw Muhammad" Contest, if the
local government sought to prevent the art contest.
Absent any proof that the Center or the Town of Garland ac-
tually tried to prevent Pamela Geller from hosting the "Draw Mu-
hammad" Art Contest, the municipality would likely fail because the
Center is almost undeniably a designated public forum. This designa-
tion is supported by the Center's purpose, which is described as
"providing the community of Garland a first-class facility which hosts
a variety of events."171 The Center's website shows that there are no
explicit regulations for the speech allowed and presents examples of
events ranging from weddings, church services, and corporate meet-
ings.172 However, the Center can still serve as an example, as New
169 Id. at 78 (citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) ("Most
importantly, the relevant Supreme Court case law compels the conclusion that
the MBTA has not created a designated public forum. The only Supreme Court
case directly on point, the plurality opinion in [Lehman], found that where a city
banned all "political" (i.e. candidate and issues) advertising on its transit system
... the city had not created a designated public forum.")).
170 Mass. Bay Transp., 781 F.3d at 587-90.
171 About the Center, CURTIS CURWELL CENT. (2015),
http://www.curtisculwellcenter.com/about-the-center/index.cfm.
172 See generally CURTIS CURWELL CENT. (2015),
http://www.curtisculwellcenter.com/.
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York's MTA did, to show what a government forum must do to be re-
viewed with less than strict scrutiny.173
Naturally, the forum regulation strategy has a limit: Islam-
ophobic speech and depictions of the Prophet Muhammad that occur
outside a limited public forum. Regulation of limited forums is a
powerful way for the government to limit certain kinds of speech
with a lot of discretion, but it is a regulatory scheme with a very nar-
row reach. For these reasons, the second part of the proposed solu-
tion can be applied in scenarios beyond limited forums.
B. National SecurityJustification and the Modified Brandenburg Test
The second solution seeks to provide an option for the gov-
ernment to regulate speech beyond what limited and designated fo-
rums allow. Particularly, I propose a modified version of the Bran-
denburg v. Ohiol7 4 advocacy for violence test,175 using national
security as an additional consideration. However, because of the ex-
pansiveness of the second solution, it would be inevitably subject to
very strict scrutiny as compared to the regulation of limited forums.
National security interests and considerations are not foreign
to First Amendment jurisprudence. For instance, a notable time
when the Supreme Court recognized national security was in New
York Times v. United States ("Pentagon Papers").176 In Pentagon Pa-
pers, the government sought to enjoin 'the New York Times and
Washington Post with a prior restraint to prevent the disclosure and
publication of allegedly sensitive reports regarding the Vietnam
War.177 In this instance, the government failed to meet its burden of
national security, but it was nonetheless recognized in the opinion
and accompanying concurrences by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and
White.178
173 See generally Metro. Transp. Auth., 880 F.Supp.2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
174 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
17s See supra Part III.B.
176 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
177 Id. at 714.
17 8 Id. at 714, 725-32.
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Revisiting the Brandenburg test, I believe an adequate meth-
od for the government to justify suppression of Islamophobic speech
should not only be considered under Brandenburg, but also with a
deferential national security factor. For example, when speech falls
short of express advocacy for violence or inciting a violent response,
the government should be able to overcome the near miss of the tra-
ditional Brandenburg test with a showing of how contrary certain
speech is to national security efforts. By incorporating this new ele-
ment into the Brandenburg test, the government is no longer so re-
stricted by a rigid application and search for express advocacy for
lawbreaking. Instead, it can serve its interest in protecting its citi-
zens at the expense of censoring hate speakers when their speech
leads to the provocation of other unlawful actors.
As stated earlier, the First Amendment does not command us
to use tunnel vision.179 Using the examples from Denmark and
France,180 the government would have a strong argument that hold-
ing a "Draw Muhammad" Contest comes close to satisfying the Bran-
denburg test outright. The government has a legitimate national se-
curity interest in preventing events which historically have led to
mass shootings, providing further support for the use of the new
test. In balancing the harm between the suppressed speech of Islam-
ophobic speakers with the prevention of an armed attack on a com-
munity, the latter should always trump the former. Speech is invalu-
able insofar as it expresses a political objective, but speech with an
arguably dubious message cannot withstand the protection of hu-
man life and limb when recent history shows us how likely, violent,
or deadly the response will be.181
179 Karst, supra note 114.
80 See supra Part II.A-B.
1s1 It is important to note that the national security interest is not permanent
and ongoing. Particularly, it is relevant with regard to Islamophobic speech be-
cause of the United States' conflict with ISIL. Therefore, the national security
interest in prohibiting Islamophobic speech wouldn't be as strong as it is now,
thirty years ago, assuming that the conflict with ISIL has seen been resolved.
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C. Return of the Heckler's Veto
The final solution provides another vehicle for censorship
which requires action from both public and private actors. This solu-
tion is called the Heckler's Veto-a censorship theory which allows
local law enforcement o suppress a speaker when his or her speech
has or will imminently incite a crowd of retaliatory listeners.182
The Heckler's Veto originates from the majority opinion of
Feiner v. New York'83 written by Chief Justice Vinson.184 Feiner is a
case that was decided in the years leading up to the African-
American Civil Rights Movement and brought forth a holding which
is difficult to defend because of its unflattering facts. In Feiner, the
petitioner (Irving Feiner) was convicted in Syracuse, New York for
disorderly conduct pursuant to an "open-air meeting" (or speech), he
held at a street corner.85 The content of his speech included making
derogatory remarks towards then-President Truman, the American
Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and other local politicians.186 During
his speech, he attracted a crowd of about seventy-five to eighty
mixed race people who were "filling the sidewalk and spreading out
into the street."87 Upon being notified of the large crowd in Syra-
cuse, local police also observed that Feiner's speech "gave the im-
pression that he was endeavoring to arouse the [Black] people
against the whites" and was advocating for the Black citizens of Sy-
racuse to "rise up in arms and fight for equal rights."188 His speech
proved especially polarizing. As Feiner's comments continued, ex-
citement was being stirred up among the crowd and the police
feared that a riot or fight was going to ensue.189 Particularly, angry
182 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) ("It is one thing to say that the
police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views,
and another to say that... they are powerless to prevent a breach of peace.").
183 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
184Id.
185 Id. at 316.






listeners were seeking to harm Feiner.190 In an attempt to defuse the
situation, the local police demanded that Feiner step down from his
wooden box on the corner and stop speaking.191 Ultimately, Feiner
ignored the requests by the police and, when an attack from the
crowd became imminent, the police arrested Feiner and charged him
with disorderly conduct.192
In effect, the Heckler's Veto allows law enforcement to bal-
ance the interest of an individual's freedom of speech with public
safety, and allows officers to suppress the speaker when necessary.
Though Feiner has never been formally overruled, it is relatively
dormant and is heavily criticized by some as an egregious limitation
on the freedom of speech.193 Despite its criticism, this Note argues
that it could provide a useful venue when applied to depictions of the
Prophet Muhammad.
Though this position is the most extreme of the three solu-
tions presented, in terms of protecting free speech, its application is
most suitable for other Islamophobic art events. Particularly, the
event at the Curtis Curwell Center of Garland, Texas is very similar to
the "street-corner speech" in Feiner since both are public forums.194
Next, a key factor in the Feiner decision was the presence of people
in the crowd "both for and against the speaker."95 With regards to
the "Draw Muhammad" Art Contest, there are two possible "counter-
protestors": (1) the radicalized shooters or (2) the people of Garland,
Texas. First, this approach may be flawed if the counter-protestors
are the radicalized shooters because the Heckler's Veto serves to
"prevent a breach of the peace."196 Therefore, if the "hecklers" are al-
ready breaching the peace, suppressing the speaker after the harm
has been done becomes pointless and clearly unconstitutional. How-
190 See id.
191 Id. at 318.
192 Id.
193 E.g., CAROL M. ALLEN, ENDING RACIAL PREFERENCES: THE MICHIGAN STORY 57
(2008) (citing Michigan State University professor William B. Allen who re-
ferred to the Heckler's Veto as "verbal terrorism.").
194 Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321-22 (Black, J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 317.
196 Id. at 321.
5212016]
ever, if the government can present evidence of the shooters' immi-
nent attack, they could effectively become "inchoate" hecklers, thus
prompting the government o suppress the speaker. Ultimately, this
is a much weaker justification and could lead to boundless discretion
by law enforcement o suppress speakers for illusory reasons.
Alternatively, the hecklers can be the people of Garland, Tex-
as. Short of recommending the people of Garland to break the law, if
a cohort of citizens who reject Geller and her followers' Islamopho-
bic agenda, they could, pursuant to Feiner, voice their contrary opin-
ions at the "Draw Muhammad" Contest. However, the suppression
aspect of Feiner is not invoked until a breach of peace is imminent.197
So, depending on the volatility of the discourse, the government
would only have the opportunity to step in and suppress the Islam-
ophobic speakers once the crowd devolved into lawlessness.
V. OPPOSING VIEWS
Contrary to the positions and solutions proposed in this
Note, some argue that depictions of the Prophet Muhammad, no mat-
ter how provocative, should never censored or otherwise regulated
by the government or private actors. The two prevailing arguments
within this opposing view are the marketplace of ideas theory and a
less legally-based "cowardice" argument.
A. Marketplace of Ideas
First, the marketplace of ideas theory, subscribes to the belief
that "the more speech, the better" and speech should almost never
be regulated.198 Further, the marketplace of ideas (also known as the
"search-for-truth" rationale) holds that in the end "truth" will prevail
197 Id.
198 STONE, supra note 101 at 9 ("The search-for-truth rationale for the protection
of free expression rests on the premise that 'when men have realized that time
has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good de-
sired is better reached by free trade in ideas .... ").
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and the listeners will be able to discern it from the falsities without
the government needing to regulate anything.199
However, this marketplace theory does not apply in instanc-
es of hate speech which leads to violence. Particularly, the concern
about hate speech is not the truth or falsity of the statements, but ra-
ther the effect it will have on the listeners. The effect on the listeners
includes marginalizing the targeted group and creating the "us ver-
sus them" phenomenon, which pits the non-targeted listeners
against the targeted group of the hate speech. As the "us versus
them" phenomenon is propagated throughout the national conversa-
tion, hate crimes are perpetrated like the ones referenced by Attor-
ney General Lynch.200 Because of the lack of a factual point, there is
no "search-for-truth" in the statement. The central reason why the
marketplace of ideas counterargument fails to address hate speech is
because the theory relies on a premise of impossible rationality and
skepticism exhibited by all listeners, and it further ignores the sus-
ceptibility and exploitation of fear. In the case of Islamophobia, ex-
amples of terror attacks carried out by radicalized criminals who
pervert the religion of Islam. persuade people to think that Islam is a
"violent religion" that should be feared, while in reality, the vast ma-
jority of the 2.2 billion Muslims on Earth are peaceful.201 This senti-
ment can be seen when prominent American voices, on both sides of
the political spectrum, propagate a false narrative that Muslims
should be feared solely because of their religion.202 Therefore, the
199 Id.
200 Gerstein, supra note 62.
201 Hanna Mayj, 2.2 Billion: World's Muslim Population Doubles, TIME (Jan. 27,
2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/01/27/2-2-billion-worlds-muslim-
population-doubles/.
202 To name a few, liberal-leaning comedian and talk show host Bill Maher, Re-
publican presidential candidate and real estate mogul, Donald J. Trump, and
Republican presidential candidate and esteemed neurosurgeon, Ben Carson.
Sarah Burris, "It was probably not the Amish": Bill Maher Urges Liberals to Wake
Up About Islam After Paris Attacks, SALON (Nov. 14, 2015, 8:25 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2015/11/14/it-was-probably-nottheamishbillmah
er-urgesliberals-to-wake-up-about islam-after-paris-attacks/; Jeremy Dia-
mond, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN (Dec. 8, 2015, 4:18
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-ban-
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marketplace of ideas rationale falls short in providing an adequate
defense for Islamophobic speech.
B. Cowardice
The second and more popular argument proffered by Pamela
Geller is the cowardice argument.203 This argument, as posted on
Geller's blog, Atlas Shrugs, argues that by preventing Islamophobic
speech, the government is serving the interests of the attackers,
submitting to the wishes of the terrorists who threaten the speakers
for their offensive messages, and embracing the jihad.204 In other
words, any kind of regulation would be punishing the wrong people.
Further, she argues that without her and similar Islamophobic
statements, "political correctness" will eventually lead to the
"[I]slamization of America" and the institution of Sharia Law in the
States.205
Ultimately, these arguments are without merit and advocate
for a "machismo" exercise of freedom of speech which favors intoler-
ance for one religion and falsely victimizes the majority's religions as
under attack. Frankly, this kind of rhetoric and thinking is highly
counterproductive to the United States inclusiveness efforts, and
does not properly represent he sentiment of the nation. In order for
Geller's position to have any merit, it must also be true that the Unit-
ed States is a Judeo-Christian nation and other religions, such as Is-
lam, must be resisted from mainstream acceptance, accommoda-
tions, and be resented as "un-American." Unfortunately for Geller,
immigration/; Eric Bradner, Ben Carson Again Explains Concerns with a Muslim
President, CNN (Sept. 27, 2015, 2:25 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/27/politics/ben-carson-muslim-president-
sharia-law/.
203 E.g. Pamela Geller, Coward Cartoonist Garry Trudeau Calls Charlie Hebdo
"Hate Speech": "Free Speech...Becomes It  Own Kind of Fanaticism," ATLAS SHRUGS
(Apr. 11, 2015), http://pamelageller.com/2015/04/coward-cartoonist-garry-
trudeau-calls-charlie-hebdo-hate-speech-free-speech-becomes-its-own-kind-of-
fanaticism.html/.
204 See generally ATLAS SHRUGS, www.pamelageller.com- (last visited Mar. 3,
2016).
205 Id.
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the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment2 06 exist to reject this very premise and leave her position on
constitutionally-unsupported ground. Further, her position favors
hostility and xenophobia over tolerance and acceptance. At the risk
of making ideological arguments rather than legal ones, the First
Amendment and other prevailing American values do not adhere to
paranoia and xenophobia in determining which religions and ethnic-
ities deserve full respect and consideration in the national communi-
ty under the Constitution.207 Therefore, the United States' commit-
ment to respecting the Muslim community by choosing to prosecute
speakers when they challenge national security interests and incite
violence, as the United States would do for any other religion or eth-
nicity, is consistent with the First Amendment and American values.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Note argues that depictions of the Prophet Muhammad
are unique expressions of speech and should be evaluated different-
ly, given their historical significance and context. The Note opens
with a summary of Islamophobia, the controversial depictions of the
Prophet Muhammad, and the violent retaliation related to the
events. Next, the Note applies traditional First Amendment jurispru-
dence to examine whether the government has a basis to regulate
depictions of the Prophet Muhammad. In response, three solutions
are proposed: (1) regulation by the government hrough limited and
designated forums; (2) a modified Brandenburg v. Ohio208 test with a
national security consideration; and (3) resurgence of the Heckler's
Veto from Feiner v. New York.209 Finally, two prevailing counterar-
guments regarding the marketplace of ideas and cowardice were ad-
dressed.
As shown by the analysis of the Chaplinksy categories, depic-
tions of the Prophet Muhammad fail to justify any differential treat-
ment if we examine their content alone. However, the historical sig-
206 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
207 See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
208 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
209 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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nificance as shown by violent responses both internationally and
domestically should demand a different analysis. Given the United
States' political and military involvement in the Middle East in the
past decades, it is imperative for the government to bolster relation-
ships with Muslim-Americans as well as the international Muslim
community in order to purge the world of the terrorists who have
perverted the religion and commit heinous crimes in its name. By
failing to appreciate these relationships, the United States risks play-
ing into the hand of terrorist groups like ISIL who seek to exploit the
division between the West and Muslim communities.210 Finally, in-
stead of succumbing to fear and hatred, the United States should
promote safety and tolerance while rejecting the perversion of Islam,
both by radicalized militants and Islamophobic organizations like
the AFDI. When such speech creates violent tension, the government
should take a stand to protect its citizens while respecting the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
210 As these poor relations with the Muslim world are exacerbated, terror
groups' recruiting strategy becomes easier and an "us (Muslims) versus them
(Western civilization)" fallacy is propagated.
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